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THE CONSUMER'S SLEEPING GIANT-THE
FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
LABELING ACT
Franklin D. Houser*
INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to curb the growing number of deaths result-
ing from accidental poisonings, in 1927 Congress passed the Fed-
eral Caustic Poison Act,' a consumer safety act. Neither this
Act nor common law remedies against manufacturers were found
to be sufficient to alleviate the growing problems of accidental
deaths of children caused by the ingestion of common household
products containing lethal ingredients.2 The Act covered only
twelve harmful compounds or products used in households in
1927. Since that time, America's technology has boomed, and
the Madison Avenue-inspired proliferation of home products
has more than kept pace. Millions of household products have
been developed and sold to the consuming public. Many of these
products are potentially harmful, yet bear either insufficient warn-
ings or are totally devoid of warnings. In 1960 alone, it was esti-
mated that approximately 300,000 hazardous household substances
were being marketed without proper labeling.'
1. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 489, §§ 1-10, 12, 44 Stat. 1406-10.
2. See generally Comment, Federal Hazardous Substances Legislation: Ef-
fect on Consumer Protection and Manufacturing Liability, 13 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 504 (1972). The early common law remedies were inadequate to curb
accidental deaths because the law placed no effective duty upon manufacturers
of household products to alleviate the risk of accidental poisoning. Suits against
manufacturers were essentially precluded by virtue of the privity doctrine, which
meant that manufacturers had no liability to injured customers. Although excep-
tions to the privity rule later arose, the possibility of consumer recovery against
a manufacturer was still slight due to the difficulties in sustaining the burden
of proving that the manufacturer had been negligent and that the negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury. Since a product defect was not conclusive
proof of negligence, even under the later doctrine of strict liability in tort, the
consumer's position was fraught with difficulties. To recover under this doctrine
he had to prove that the product was defective, but was unable to do so because
the dangerous chemicals contained in the product accidentally ingested did not
constitute a defect, but rather, were necessary to enable the product to clean
properly or to effectuate any other intended use for which it was purchased. Id.
at 506-07.
3. 106 CONG. REc. 5536 (1960) (remarks of Senator Bush).
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Following enactment of the Federal Caustic Poison Act, ad-
ditional laws were passed which also included requirements for
certain descriptive labeling,4 but the Congress discovered that the
scope of these acts was no longer sufficient. There were numer-
ous hazardous chemicals used in the household which were not
subject to any of these laws. A congressional report concluded
that,
In recent years rapid advances have been made in the
field of applied chemistry, and these advances, although gen-
erally beneficial to the public at large, have posed new prob-
lems which can adequately be dealt with only through public
education and Government regulation. . . . There is a need
for legislation requiring better labeling of poisonous and
hazardous materials that are brought into the home.5
To meet this need for new legislation, in 1960 Congress passed
the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act (FHSLA).6
The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act has been
in effect for over thirteen years and has been substantially ex-
panded by three acts 7 designed to protect children from haz-
ardous toys and household substances. Although broad in its
scope and ambitious in its purpose, the FHSLA has largely
proven to be a "sleeping giant." The manufacturers and distribu-
tors of products subject to the provisions of the Act have largely
ignored its requirements. In addition, the American consumer
has failed to recognize and avail himself of the protection af-
forded by the Act.
This article will examine the labeling requirements which
must be met by persons selling certain goods in interstate com-
merce and describe the products subject to the Act. The article
4. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
135-135k (1970) (enacted June 25, 1947, ch. 125, § 2, 61 Stat. 163); The Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-82 (1970) (enacted June
25, 1938, ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040). See Fisher, Cosmetic Labeling: The
FDA's Response to Consumer Needs, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 542 (1974).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reported in 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2834 (1960).
6. The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74
(1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (Supp. 1972). [In 1972 Congress
amended sections 1262-74 by transferring the administrative and enforcement
functions of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, consisting of five Commissioners appointed by the
President and approved by the Senate. Hereinafter, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1970)
will be cited with the amendment presumed.]
7. The Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-76 (1970)
(enacted Dec. 30, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-601, § 7(a), 84 Stat. 1670); The Child
Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1262, 1274 (1970)
(enacted Nov. 6, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 2(a), (c), (d), 83 Stat. 187-89);
The Child Protection Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-65, 1273 (1970) (enacted
Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-756, §§ 2(a)-(c), 3(a) 80 Stat. 1303-04).
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will also discuss those activities which are strictly prohibited un-
der the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act and the ef-
fects of these prohibitions. Finally, it will analyze the statutory
penalties for violations of the Act as well as the civil remedies
available to consumers when the minimum requirements of the
Act are not met.
LABELING REQUIREMENTS
One of the stated purposes of the original Act was to pro-
vide nationwide uniformity in the labeling of potentially hazard-
ous substances. 8 It was believed that in the absence of a fed-
eral law, diverse labeling regulations would 'be adopted by the
states which would lead to a multiplicity of requirements and cre-
ate unnecessary confusion in labeling. 9 In addition, it was noted
that it would be impractical for a marketer of products sold
interstate to label his products separately for those states and cities
which had developed their own labeling standards."0 In order to
implement the purpose of providing nationwide uniformity, the
Congress in 1969 pre-empted the labeling requirements of the states
by declaring,
that it is the intent of the Congress to supercede any and
all laws of the States and political subdivisions thereof insofar
as they may now or hereafter provide for the precautionary
labeling of any substance or article intended or suitable for
household use. . . .11
In the area of household product labeling therefore, the Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act requirements are now deter-
minative of whether a particular warning is adequate, although
prior to the Act, labeling requirements were determined by indi-
vidual state legislatures.'12
The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act defines a
label as a display of written, printed or graphic matter on the con-
tainer of any substance. 13  In addition to the foregoing, the
label must be legible and must be accompanied by complete di-
rections for proper use.'" Moreover, the amended version of
8. H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reported in 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2833 (1960).
9. Id. at 2835.
10. H.R. REP. No. 2166, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reported in 3 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4097 (1966).
11. Child Protection and Toy Safety Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1970)
(enacted Nov. 6, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 2(a), (c), (d), 83 Stat. 187-89).
12. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 28753, 28755 (West Supp.
1973) which delineate California's labeling requirements. These requirements
are identical to the labeling provisions in the Federal Act.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(n) (1970).
14. Id.
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the Act specifically applies the labeling requirements to unpack-
aged as well as packaged goods."5
The general labeling standards of the FHSLA require that
certain matters be stated "conspicuously"' 6 on the labels of haz-
ardous substances. 7 The name 18 and place of business'" of the
manufacturer, packer, distributor or seller must appear on the la-
bel. The standards also require that the common or usual name of
the hazardous substance be obvious to the eye of the consumer.20
If there is no common or usual name the Act permits the use of
a chemical name. 2' In addition, the Commission established
under FHSLA may allow the generic name to be placed on the
label.2 The word "WARNING" or "CAUTION" must be notice-
able on all hazardous substances unless the word "DANGER" is
required -to be used.23 The labeling standards mandate that a short
description of the principal hazard be made plainly visible on the
label. 24 Examples of such a description would be "Flammable" or
"Vapor Harmful."2 Precautionary measures describing any action
which should be followed or avoided is also to appear conspicuously
on the label.26 In addition the label should include the state-
ment "keep out of the reach of children" or its equivalent.
2 7  If
the article is intended for use by children and is not a banned
hazardous substance, adequate directions for the protection of
children from the hazard it presents should be clearly visible on
the label.28
Certain types of hazardous substances are subject to special
labeling requirements, The signal word "DANGER" must be
15. Id.
16. "[C]onspicuously" in section 2(p)(1) and (p)( 2 ) of the act means
that, under customary conditions of purchase, storage, and use, the re-
quired information shall be visible, noticeable, and in clear and legible
English. Some factors affecting a warning's prominence or conspicu-
ousness are: Location, size of type, and contrast of printing against
background. Also bearing on the effectiveness of a warning might be
the effect of the package contents if spilled on the label. Unless im-
practicable because of the nature of the substance, the label shall be
of such construction and finish as to withstand reasonably foreseeable
spillage through foreseeable use.
21 C.F.R. § 191.1(d) (1973).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1) (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(A) (1970).
19. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(B) (1970).
21. Id.
22. Id. See note 6 supra.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(C), (D) (1970). See notes 29-32 and accom-
panying text infra.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(E) (1970).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(F).
27. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(J)(i).
28. Id. § 1261(p)(l)(J)(ii).
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placed on the label of all substances which are extremely flam-
mable, corrosive or highly toxic as defined in sections 1261(1)
(i) and (h) respectively.29 In addition, the word "POISON"
must appear on any hazardous substance defined as "highly
toxic." 0  Instructions for first aid treatment are to be included
on the label when necessary or appropriate. 1  Finally, if a pack-
age requires special care, the label should contain instructions for
handling and storage."2
All required label declarations are to be located promi-
nently, 8 in conspicuous and legible type, 4 and must be printed
in the English language.8 5
Congress has provided for flexibility in the Act by empow-
ering the Commission to vary or add to the labeling require-
ments as it finds necessary in view of any special hazard pre-
sented by a particular substance. 6 This flexibility is essential
to insure that the Act will not become obsolete. As new hazard-
ous substances enter the market, it is conceivable that the dan-
gers they present to the consumer will necessitate an addition to
or change in the labeling requirements. The Commission is also
authorized to exempt products from these requirements "to the
extent it determines to be consistent with adequate protection of
the public health and safety."87
In addition to the labeling requirements previously described,
the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 197038 provides that the
Consumer Product Safety Commission may, under specified cir-
cumstances, -prescribe packaging standards for certain hazardous
substances.89  A detailed discussion of those standards is, how-
ever, beyond the scope of this article.4"
29. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(C).
30. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(H). Seenote41 infra.
31. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(G).
32. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(I).
33. 21 C.F.R. § 191.1(d) (1971).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(2) (1970).
35. Id. While Congress only requires that the label be printed in English,
it might be desirable to have bilingual labels, especially for products which flow
into those areas where the primary language of a substantial number of residents
is one other than English. The Commission, under 15 U.S.C. § 1262(b)
(1970), could require that labels be bilingual under its power to establish reason-
able variations or additional label requirements for the protection of public health
and safety.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1262(b) (1970). See note 6 supra.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1262(c) (1970).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471-76 (1970) (enacted Dec. 30, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
601, § 7(a), 84 Stat. 1670). See note 6 supra.
39. Id. § 1472, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (Supp. 1972). See note
6 supra.
40. The Commission basically must use a reasonableness standard and may
use available scientific, medical and engineering data regarding special packaging
[Vol. 14
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Inextricably tied to the labeling requirements of the Act is
the structure of product classification under the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Labeling Act. Under the Act's basic scheme,
products can be divided into three categories: hazardous sub-
stances, misbranded hazardous substances and banned hazard-
ous substances. While ,hazardous substances and misbranded
hazardous substances are allowed to enter the flow of commerce
once they have been properly labeled, banned hazardous sub-
stances are completely restricted from channels of interstate com-
merce even though they meet the labeling requirements of the
Act.
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION
Hazardous Substances
A product which is subject to the Act's labeling require-
ments is designated a "hazardous substance." Basically,
[t]he term "hazardous substance" means: (1) (A) Any
substance which (i) is toxic,41 (ii) is corrosive, 42 (iii) is an
irritant,43 (iv) is a strong sensitizer, 44 (v) is flammable or
combustible, 45 or (vi) generates pressure through decomposi-
tion, heat, or other means, if such substance or mixture of
substances may cause substantial personal injury or substan-
and concerning accidental ingestions, injuries and illnesses. Id. §§ 1471-76. For
an article discussing the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, see generally Corn-
gan, Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 26 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 447 (1971).
41. The term "toxic" shall apply to any substance (other than a radio-
active substance) which has the capacity to produce personal injury or
illness to man through ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through any
body surface.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(g) (1970).
42. The term "corrosive" means any substance which in contact with
living tissue will cause destruction of tissue by chemical action; but
shall not refer to action on inanimate surfaces.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(i)(1970).
43. The term "irritant" means any substance not corrosive within the
meaning of subparagraph (i) of this section which on immediate, pro-
longed, or repeated contact with normal living tissue will induce a local
inflammatory reaction.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(j) (1970).
44. The term "strong sensitizer" means a substance which will cause on
normal living tissue through an allergic or photodynamic process a hy-
persensitivity which becomes evident on reapplication of the same sub-
stance and which is designated as such by the [Commission]. Before
designating any substance as a strong sensitizer, the [Commission], upon
consideration of the reaction, shall find that the substance has a sig-
nificant potential for causing hypersensitivity.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(k) (1970).
45. The term "flammable" shall apply to any substance which has a
flash point of above twenty degrees to and including eighty degrees
Fahrenheit . . . and the term "combustible" shall apply to any sub-
stance which has a flash point above eighty degrees Fahrenheit to and
including one hundred and fifty degrees ....
15 U.S.C. § 1261(1) (1970) (method of determining flash point also desig-
nated).
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tial illness 46 during or as a proximate result47 of any cus-
tomary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use 48 including
reasonably foreseeable ingestion by children. 49
Congress suggested certain criteria to ,be used in determining
whether a particular substance was hazardous. The basic stand-
ards to be used are those recognized in common law civil
liability cases in which a seller is found to have had a duty to
warn potential purchasers of the inherent dangers of his product. 50
The word "substance" is never defined by the Act. It was
earlier suggested that the word should be limited to its chemical
definition,"' meaning basically any "particular kind of matter,
whether element, compound, or mixture." 52  One authority noted
that throughout the Act the provisions spoke only of the "con-
tainer" and the "label on the container" and made no mention
of warning labels on "substances" as such. Thus it was suggested
that the Act did not pertain to those articles which could be sold
unpackaged, such as toys. Rather, it was submitted, the Act ap-
plied only to chemical products "which from their very nature must
be in a container in order to be handled or used.153
Recent amendments have expanded the term "hazardous
substances" to include articles used by children such as toys. In
light of these amendments the definition now makes the Act ap-
plicable to practically any product which causes harm in one of
the six prescribed ways.54 The 1969 amendment broadened
the definition by including,
[a]ny toy or other article intended for use by children which
the [Commission] by regulation determines, in accordance
with section 1262(e) of this title, presents an electrical, 55
46. Substantial personal injury or illness. This term means any illness
or injury of a significant nature. It need not be severe or serious. What
is excluded by the word "substantial" is a wholly insignificant or negli-
gible injury or illness.
21 C.F.R. § 191.1(p) (1973).
47. Proximate result. A proximate result is one that follows in the
course of events without an unforeseeable, intervening, independent
cause.
21 C.F.R. § 191.1(q) (1973).
48. Reasonably foreseeable handling or use. This includes the reason-
ably foreseeable accidental handling or use, not only by the purchaser
or intended user of the product, but by all others in a household, es-
pecially children.
21 C.F.R. § 191.1(r) (1973).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f) (1) (A) (1970).
50. S. REP. No. 1158, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
51. Scriba, The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 17 Bus. LAw.
137 (1961).
52. Id. at 139.
53. Id. at 140.
54. See notes 41-46 supra.
55. An article may be determined to present an electrical hazard if, in
normal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or
[Vol. 14
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mechanical, 6 or thermal57 hazard. 58
The definitions of "electrical", "mechanical" and "thermal"
hazards explain that an article may 'be determined to present any
one of these hazards if, when subjected to reasonably foreseeable
damage or abuse, its design or manufacture may cause a par-
ticular personal injury or illness.59 These definitions indicate that
Congress intended to make any toy that was foreseeably harmful
subject to the labeling requirements of the Act.
To avoid uncertainty in applying the Act's standard of "rea-
sonably foreseeable", 6° Congress gave the Consumer Product
Safety Commission power 'to declare a substance "hazardous" if it
finds that a product meets the Act's basic definition under section
1261(f) (1) (A). 61  It is conceivable that instances may occur
where a particular substance would not ,be included within the tech-
nical definition of the Act. As a result, uncertainty arises as to
whether such a substance would be subject to the Act's provisions.
By giving the Commission the power to determine that a particular
substance is hazardous, this problem of uncertainty in the applica-
tion of the Act can be avoided.
The procedure which the Commission is to use in declaring
a substance to be hazardous is found in the formal rule-making
procedure embodied in sections 371 (e)-(g) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.6 2 Any action to declare a substance
hazardous is initiated by a proposal made by the Commission or
by petition of any interested person.0 3 Within thirty days after
abuse, its design or manufacture may cause personal injury or illness
by electrical shock.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(r) (1970).
56. An article may be determined to present a mechanical hazard if,
in normal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or
abuse, its design or manufacture presents an unreasonable risk of per-
sonal injury or illness (1) from fracture, fragmentation, or disassembly
of the article, (2) from propulsion of the article (or any part or acces-
sory thereof), (3) from points or other protrusions, surfaces, edges,
openings, or closures, (4) from moving parts, (5) from lack or insuffi-
ciency of controls to reduce or stop motion, (6) as a result of self-
adhering characteristics of the article, (7) because the article (or any
part or accessory thereof) may be aspirated or ingested, (8) because
of instability, or (9) because of any other aspect of the article's design
or manufacture.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(s) (1970).
57. An article may be determined to present a thermal hazard if, in nor-
mal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse,
its design or manufacture presents an unreasonable risk of personal in-
jury or illness because of heat as from heated parts, substances, or sur-
faces.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(t) (1970).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(D) (1970).
59. See notes 55-57 supra.
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1262(a)(1)(1970). See note 6 supra.
62. 21 U.S.C. §H 371-1056 (1970).
63. Under this procedure it appears that a manufacturer desiring certainty
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the Commission releases its public order regarding the proposal,6 4
any person who will be adversely affected by the order may file
objections to it with the Commission and request a public hear-
ing. Until final action is taken on the objections the order will
remain ineffective. 6  The Commission will then hold public
hearings at which any interested person may present his views.
Upon completion of the hearing the Commission will act on the
objections and issue a final order which could include the pro-
mulgation of a new regulation. The order will be based on a fair
evaluation of the entire record, 6 setting forth detailed findings
of fact upon which the order is based. The order will not
take effect prior to ninety days after its publication. 67 In the case
of actual controversy as to the validity of any order, any person
who will be adversely affected by the order if it is placed in
effect may, within the ninety days, file a petition with the United
States Court of Appeals for a judicial review of the order.6"
Although section 1262(a) (1) allows the Commission to de-
clare certain substances to be hazardous, it does not restrict the
coverage of the Act to those substances alone. Thus, the provi-
sion provides for clarity of application without compromising the
broad sweep of the definition by limiting coverage to certain
named substances, as under the Federal Caustic Poison Act.6"
There are numerous substances which are specifically ex-
empted from the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act.7"
The term "hazardous substances" is not applied to pesticides
which are subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act.7 ' Also exempted are food, drugs or cos-
metics subject to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.72
Common fuels stored in containers and used for household cook-
ing, heating or refrigeration are not covered by the Act,73 since
the user is usually completely aware of the nature of the prod-
uct.74  Another reason such fuels are exempted is because regula-
could submit his product to the Commission prior to its release to the public,
and could thereby ascertain whether it would be declared a hazardous substance
and require special labeling.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1) (1970).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (2) (1970).
66. 21 U.S.C. §§ 371-1056 (1970).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (3) (1970).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f)(1) (1970).
69. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 489, §§ 1-10, 12, 44 Stat. 1406-10.
70. 15 U.S.C. §1261(f)(2) (1970).
71. Id. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
72. Id.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(2) (1970).
74. H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reported in 2 U.S. CODE
CONO. & AD. NEws 2837 (1960).
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tions of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribe specifica-
tions for the labeling of containers for flammable liquids and
gases used as fuels.7 5  An exception to this exemption, however,
is fuel stored in a portable container. A portable container
used for delivery or temporary or additional storage which con-
tains a substance that is hazardous as defined in the FHSLA is
subject to the labeling requirements of the Act even though it
contains fuel to be used in heating, cooking or refrigeration.76
Other substances specifically exempted from the Act are any
source material, special nuclear material or by-product material
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954."
In addition to the above exemptions there are instances in
which the application of labeling requirements is impractical..
The Commission is authorized to exempt certain hazardous sub-
stances from full labeling compliance if it finds the size of the
package containing the substance makes labeling difficult, the
substance presents only a minor hazard, or "for other good and
sufficient reason. ' 78  Numerous exemptions have been made on
the basis of small packages, minor hazards and special circum-
stances. 79  Examples of such exemptions are book matches,
wrapping paper and containers of certain pastes and waxes."'
The definition of "hazardous substances" under the FHSLA
does not limit application of the Act to chemical substances only.
Any product which is capable of causing harm in one of the six
prescribed ways is subject to the Act. In addition to the sub-
stances which fall within the technical definition of hazardous
substances, as well as those which the Commission determines
to be within the purview of the Act, misbranded and banned
hazardous substances are included within the scope of the Act.
Misbranded Hazardous Substances
The Act defines a "misbranded hazardous substance" as any
substance which is subject to the Act but fails to meet its pack-
aging or labeling requirements.
The term "misbranded hazardous substance" means a haz-
ardous substance (including a toy, or other article intended
for use by children, which bears or contains a hazardous sub-
stance in such manner as to be susceptible of access by a
75. 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1970).
76. 21 C.F.R. § 191.61(b) (1973).
77. These substances are exempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(3) (1970), as
defined by The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
78. 21 C.F.R. § 191.62(b) (1973).
79. 21 C.F.R. § 191.63 (1973).
80. Id.
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child to whom such toy or other article is entrusted) in-
tended, or packaged in a form suitable, for use in the house-
hold or by children, if the packaging or labeling of such sub-
stance is in violation of an applicable regulation issued pur-
suant to section 1472 or 1473 of this title (Poison Preven-
tion Act) or if such substance, except as otherwise provided
by or pursuant to section 1262 of this title, fails . . . to
meet the labeling requirements of this Act.8'
To be a "misbranded hazardous substance" as defined above,
a substance must be a "hazardous substance"; be intended, or
packaged in a form suitable for use in the household"2 or
by children; and, violate a packaging or labeling requirement of
the Act. The requirement that the substance be intended for
"use by children" is important. It has been held that a person
selling a hazardous substance is charged with a duty to inquire
whether children would use the product.8 '
The court in United States v. 7 Cases, Cracker Balls s4 dis-
cussed the various elements of a misbranded hazardous sub-
stance. In 7 Cases, Cracker Balls,8s the government alleged
that certain fireworks, "Cracker Balls," were being sold in mis-
branded packages in violation of the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Labeling Act.86 The "cracker balls" were composed of
small quantities of gunpowder and particles of sand or flint in
papier mdch6 coatings. If the "cracker balls" were thrown
against a hard surface or struck, they exploded with a loud noise. s7
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p) (1970).
82. Hazardous substances intended or packaged in a form suitable for
use in the house. "Hazardous substances intended or packaged in a
form suitable for use in the household" means any hazardous substance,
whether or not packaged, that under any customary or reasonably fore-
seeable condition of purchase, storage, or use may be brought into or
around a house, apartment, or other place where people dwell, or in
or around any related building or shed, including but not limited to a
garage, carport, barn, or storage shed. The term includes such articles
as polishes or cleaners designed primarily for professional use but that
are available in retail stores such as hobby shops for non-professional
use. Also included are such items as anti-freeze and radiator cleaners
that although principally for car use may be stored in or around dwell-
ing places. The term does not include industrial supplies that might
be taken into a home by a serviceman. An article labeled as and mar-
keted solely for industrial use does not become subject to this act be-
cause of the possibility that an industrial worker may misappropriate a
supply for his own use. Size of unit or container is not the only index
of whether the article is suitable for use in or around the household.
The test shall be whether under any reasonably foreseeable condition
of purchase, storage, or use the article may be found in or around a
dwelling.
21 C.F.R. § 191.1(c) (1973) (emphasis added).
83. United States v. Chalaire, 316 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. La. 1970).
84. 253 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 772.
87. Id.
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The court found that ithe product was a hazardous substance
as defined by the Act in that it was flammable and generated
pressure through decomposition, heat or other means. 88  The
court noted that the cracker ball might cause substantial per-
sonal injury as a proximate result of any reasonably foreseeable
handling or use.89 It was also noted that the cracker balls were
"in a container intended or suitable for household use." 90  Thus
the court held that, to avoid being a "misbranded package of' a
hazardous substance", a "label" had to be affixed to the plastic
envelope in which the cracker balls were packagedY1 The
court noted that it was not required that each cracker ball bear
such a label.92 While it can be seen from this decision that a mis-
branded hazardous substance can be made to comply with the
requirements of the Act by relabeling the product to provide a
warning as to its inherently dangerous nature, a banned hazard-
ous substance, on the other hand, is subject to the strictest pro-
scriptions of the Act. Although a banned hazardous sub-
stance may be packaged and labeled in a manner which complies
with the Act, it may be completely prohibited from entering the
flow of interstate commerce if the Commission finds the pro-
hibition necessary to protect the public.
Banned Hazardous Substances
The term "banned hazardous substances" as defined in the
FHSLA is applied to two groups of substances. One group in-
cludes,
any toy, or other article intended for use by children, which
is a hazardous substance or which ...contains a hazardous
substance in such a manner as to be susceptible of access
by a child to whom such toy or other article is entrusted.
93
The second group covered includes any hazardous substance
intended or packaged for use in the household which the Com-
mission classifies as a "banned hazardous substance" if it finds
that the protection of the public health and safety will be fur-
thered by keeping such a substance out of the channels of inter-
state commerce. A product may be so designated even though it
meets the labeling requirements of the Act.94
Section 1261(q) (1) allows the Commission to exempt two
types of articles from the first group. Articles which by their na-
88. Id. at 773.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(g)(1) (1970). See note 6 supra.
94. Id.
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ture require the inclusion of a hazardous substance or necessar-
ily present an electrical, mechanical or thermal hazard may be ex-
empted if they bear adequate labeling. 5 The labeling must give
directions and warnings for safe use. These articles must be in-
tended for use by children who are mature enough to "read and
heed such directions and warnings.""0  An example of such an
article is a chemistry set. Common fireworks are the second type
of article which may be exempted if the Commission determines
that they can be adequately labeled to protect those purchasing
and using them. 7 Examples of common fireworks are cone
fountains, cylinder fountains and sparklers.
The receipt and delivery in interstate commerce of any
banned hazardous substance is prohibited by section 1263 of the
Act. 8 Thus section 1261(q)(1) of the Act, read together with
section 1263, gives the Consumer Product Safety Commission the
unique power to completely ban a product from interstate com-
merce. If a particular substance meets the definition of a "banned
hazardous substance" and the Commission determines that the sub-
stance does not fall within any of the specified exemptions, that
substance would be banned from interstate commerce.
The hazards presented by certain substances cannot be
eliminated effectively even by warnings. This is particularly true
when 'the intended users are children. Often children are too
young to read or understand warnings placed on articles which
they use. Where warnings on particular substances have proven
to be ineffective, the total ban of these substances from interstate
commerce may 'be found to be necessary for the protection of the
public.
The primary use of section 1261(q)(1) has been to ban the
sale of various dangerous childrens' toys. In United States v. Cha-
laire99 defendants Chalaire and Latapie were charged with viola-
tions of the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act arising
out of sales of fireworks. On one occasion -the defendants sold
fireworks to a thirteen-year-old who sustained substantial injury as a
result of the exploding fireworks, including the loss of fingers and
his vision in one eye. On three other occasions sales were made by
defendants to Food and Drug Inspectors. At the time of these
purchases the defendants did not inquire as to the age of the buy-
er(s), or as to whether the fireworks were to be used by chil-
dren.100 The court found that the sale of certain Class B fire-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 15 U.S.C. §1263 (1970).
99. 316 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. La. 1970).
100. Id. at 545.
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works (silver kings and cherry bombs) which were not absolutely
banned,1"' became banned hazardous substances'0 2 within the
purview of the Act when sold to children. When Class B
fireworks were to be used for bona fide agricultural purposes,
such as the protection of crops from depredation by birds and ani-
mals, they were not banned from channels of interstate commerce.
They were, however, banned from channels of commerce lead-
ing to children.0 3 Thus the court held that the sale of the fire-
works by defendants to adults, without first asking the adult
whether a child would be using them, resulted in a violation of
the Act.'04 Under the reasoning of Chalaire it appears that the
clause "intended for use by children" in section 1261 of the Act
imposes on the seller of hazardous substances the duty of inquir-
ing as -to whether the substance will ultimately be used by a
child.
In R. B. farts, Inc. v. Richardson0 5 the court implied that
darts, whch were thirteen inches long weighing approximately
one-half pound and containing an aluminum shaft and metal nose,
could properly be classified as a "banned hazardous substance."' 06
However, the court indicated that the darts could be exempt from
such a classification if they carred a warning that they were not
a toy for use by children and if they were not sold in toy stores or
toy departments. 10 7 The court's discussion in Jarts suggests that al-
though a toy or article intended for use by children may fall within
the definition of "banned hazardous substances", a court may
,attempt to fit it within one of the exemptions so that its sale will
not be completely banned. Section 1261 (q) (1) provides that the
Commission may exempt certain articles from the classification of
"banned hazardous substances" if they are properly labeled and
are intended for use by children with sufficient maturity to read
and heed the label."0 8
PROHIBITED ACTS
Numerous activities are prohibited under the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Labeling Act.0 9 A violation of the Act oc-
curs if any misbranded hazardous substance or banned hazard-
ous substance is either introduced into"10 or received"' in inter-
101. Id. at 548.
102. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 547.
105. 438 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1971).
106. Id. at 853-54.
107. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(g)(1) (1970). See note 6 supra.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1970).
110. Id. § 1263(a).
111. ld. § 1263(c).
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state commerce. The Act also forbids any actions which would
cause a hazardous substance to become a misbranded or banned
hazardous substance. 112  For example, the alteration, mutilation
or destruction of the label of a hazardous substance might cause
that substance to become a misbranded hazardous substance. It
is also a prohibited act to give a false guarantee that a particular
hazardous substance is not in a misbranded package' 13 such as
when the label of a chemistry set states that it is safe for use by
children of all ages. It should be noted, however, that the giv-
ing of such a guarantee is not a violation of the Act if the guaran-
tor relied on such a written guarantee when he received the sub-
stance."'
An additional activity prohibited under the Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Labeling Act is the failure to permit entry or in-
spection of an establishment or vehicle as authorized by section
1270(b) of the Act, or to permit access to or copying of any
record as authorized by section 1271."1 The introduction into
interstate commerce of a hazardous substance in a re-used
food, drug or cosmetic container or in a container which, al-
-though not re-used is identifiable as a food, drug or cosmetic con-
tainer is also prohibited." 6 Section 1263(f) of the Act de-
clares that the re-use of a food, drug or cosmetic container for a
hazardous substance is an action which results in the hazardous sub-
stance's becoming a misbranded hazardous substance. Finally, it
is a prohibited act for a person to reveal, or use to his own ad-
vantage, a trade secret obtained under the authority of section
1270.1I
Whenever a person performs an act which is prohibited
under section 1263, he violates the Federal Hazardous Substances
Labeling Act. It has been held that knowledge and willfulness
are not elements of such a violation." 8  In United States v. Cha-
lat're,1"9 the court noted that these elements are not mentioned
anywhere in the statute and that the legislative history of the
statute indicated that Congress did not intend knowledge and
112. Id. § 1263(b).
113. Id. § 1263(d).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 1263(e).
116. Id. § 1263(f).
117. Id. § 1263(h). Authority was given to the Secretary of HEW, under
15 U.S.C. § 1270 (1970), and is now given to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission by virtue of 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a) (Supp. 1972), to conduct exami-
nations of the various products. 15 U.S.C. § 1263(h) (1970) prohibits any em-
ployee involved in these examinations from using knowledge gained therefrom
to his advantage.
118. United States v. Chalaire, 316 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. La. 1970).
119. Id,
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willfulness to be elements of a violation.
120
The major effects of these prohibitions are to ban the sale
in interstate commerce of products which do not meet the label-
ing requirements of the Act, such as misbranded hazardous sub-
stances, and to ban from interstate commerce those products
which are so potentially hazardous that precautionary warnings
will not protect the consumer.'21
STATUTORY PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
A violation of the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling
Act is a misdemeanor offense punishable by a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars or imprisonment of not more than
ninety days, or both.122 Offenses which are committed with the
intent to defraud or mislead, or offenses following a prior of-
fense, are punishable by a fine of not more than three thousand
dollars or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.
23
The United States District Courts are given jurisdiction under the
Act to restrain violations 24 and provision is made for trial by
jury in any proceeding for criminal contempt.12 5
Any misbranded hazardous substance or banned hazardous
substance may be proceeded against on "libel of information"
while in interstate commerce or anytime thereafter. 126  To effect
a seizure of such a substance the government must bring a suit
in the United States District Court within the jurisdiction in which
the hazardous substance is located.' 27  In a suit of this type
the court usually condemns the particular substance 128 and gives
the government the right to seize the product. The paramount
consideration in using this .procedure is the protection of the
public. It should be noted that when a determination is made that
a product is in violation of the Act, that product may be liable to
seizure even though the label was thought to be sufficient when the
goods passed into interstate commerce. In Wilmington Chemi-
cal Corporation v. Celebrezze, 29 the plaintiff manufacturing com-
pany was using a label on its product, a water repellent known
as "X-33", which had been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration. However, several months subsequent to this ap-
120. Id. at 548.
121. FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 186.35 (1973).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1264(a) (1970).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 1267(a).
125. Id. § 1267(b).
126. Id. § 1265(a).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 229 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. I1. 1964).
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proval, the plaintiff was advised that the label was not in con-
formance with the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act. 130
Plaintiff was told that the usage of certain words would bring
the label into compliance. The company was also informed that
unless the, change on the label was made immediately on all
shipments made by plaintiff during the past two years, the gov-
ernment would begin seizing the product. The plaintiff brought
an action in the United States District Court for a declaratory
judgment that the new labeling requirements could only apply to
products shipped subsequent to the promulgation of this new
standard. The district court dismissed the action, noting that
prior to the action the government had attempted to work out a
voluntary program whereby the plaintiff would recall its products
and relabel them. This program, however, proved to be ineffec-
tive because plaintiff refused to recall previously sold products
deemed to be inadequately labeled and seizure of the products be-
came necessary. The court, therefore, dismissed plaintiff's suit for
declaratory judgment that the FHSLA can be applicable only to
products shipped subsequently to the promulgation of the ruling re-
quiring new labeling, noting that if plaintiff's labels were insufficient
to warn future users, they were equally insufficient to warn users
of cans previously marketed."' The court commented that, under
the Act, protection of the public is the paramount consideration
and it is the duty of the government
to do a complete job of protection and not trust to luck that
purchasers of the cans theretofore sold to dealers will be
aware enough to understand the previously approved but in-
adequately specific label.132
By finding that the labeling of the product in question was al-
ready being ably dealt with by the administrative process, the
court held that it should not interpose its jurisdiction to pass on
the labeling of a highly technical and dangerous substance, al-
though it would not uphold such administrative determinations
where the agency clearly abused its discretionary power. 33
A manufacturer or distributor must repurchase any banned
hazardous substance from the person to whom he sold it.'" 4
Such a repurchase must be made whether or not the substance
was banned at the time of the sale. 135  The manufacturer or dis-
tributor is required to refund to that purchaser the price plus
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1970).
131. 229 F. Supp. 168, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
132. Id. at 171.
133. Id. at 172.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(1), (2) (1970).
135. Id. § 1274(a).
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-any expenses incurred in returning the article or substance." '
Similarly, a retailer must repurchase a banned hazardous sub-
stance if the buyer returns it to him."17
CIVIL REMEDIES
Although violations of the Federal Hazardous Substances
Labeling Act are -penal in nature, the purpose of the Act is to pre-
vent injuries and promote safety. As an Act promoting safety, it
sets out minimum standards for labeling. Basically -these standards
require warning of the hazard presented by the product and
-instructions as to its use. If these minimum standards are not
met, the defendant could be adjudged negligent per se in an ap-
propriate civil action. 38 At least two courts have indicated that
a civil remedy would be recognized under the Act.'39 In Cross
v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County, 4 ' the plaintiff
brought an action for damages alleging that the defendants were
representing false information on the labels of their products, air
deodorizers and fresheners. The court found that the plaintiff's
allegations suggested a violation of the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Labeling Act.' 41 Although there is no specific provision
for civil recovery under the Act, the court held that such recovery
could be applied under appropriate circumstances.' 42 The Cross
court noted, however, that plaintiffs allegations were insufficient
to state a claim for private relief because she had failed to show
any damages to herself from the alleged violation.'43
In Courtney v. American Oil Co.,' Richard Courtney,
aged 10, and his father brought an action to recover damages
sustained as a result of the alleged negligence of a gasoline station
owner. The defendant had sold five cents worth of gas to Rich-
ard and a friend for use in a model airplane engine. At the time
of the purchase the defendant neither labeled the can of gas
nor warned the boys about the dangers of gasoline. Subsequent
to the sale Richard's friend ignited the gas with a cigarette lighter
and as a result Richard was burned. The trial court concluded
that the sale of the gas was not the proximate cause as a matter of
136. Id. § 1274(a)(1), (2).
137. Id. § 1274(a)(3).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965).
139. Cross v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County, 326 F. Supp. 634
(N.D. Cal. 1968), a! 'd, 442 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1971); Courtney v. American
Oil Co., 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
140. 326 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Cal. 1968), a! 'd, 442 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1971).
141. Id. at 638.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
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law of the injury and directed a verdict for the defendant.14
The district court of appeals affirmed -that decision.'46 On ap-
peal, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in not ap-
plying the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act.147 The
court of appeals noted that this Act prohibited the sale in inter-
state commerce of dangerous substances without a label describ-
ing the substance and the hazard presented by it.' 48 The court
stated however, that the Act was designed to protect the general
public rather than a limited class of plaintiffs, and, that a viola-
tion would give rise to negligence at most, but would not be conclu-
sive as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause.' 49  In
Courtney, the decision was based on the lack of proximate cause
which limits the liability of a negligent actor to the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of his negligence. Here, the gasoline
was sold for a legitimate purpose-use in a model airplane en-
gine. Because the personal injury resulted from an intentional
effort of one of the purchasers to ignite it, the court found that
the consequence of the sale was not one which was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant. It thus held for the defendant, af-
firming the trial court's ruling on proximate cause.'
Because of the protective nature of the Act, and its explicit
application, to children, it is apparent that the Courtney court
was unduly narrow in its interpretation of what was reasonably
foreseeable. It construed the reasonably foreseeable standard un-
der the Act, which expressly includes "reasonably foreseeable in-
gestion by children,""' too strictly. Had the child been injured
by ingestion of the gasoline rather than by ignition of the sub-
stance, the injury would have fallen within the foreseeable pur-
view of the Act. That one type of injury can be a reasonably
foreseeable consequence while the other cannot seems inapposite
in view of the highly flammable nature of the gasoline as well as the
protective purposes of the Act.
However, it is apparent from Courtney that to recover for
personal injuries under the Federal Hazardous Substances Label-
ing Act on a negligence claim, proximate cause must be inde-
pendently established since it is not proven merely by a showing
that the Act was violated. Consumers may be able to obtain re-
lief against violators of the Act on a theory of strict liability in
tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A states that a
145. Id. at 677.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A) (1970).
151. 220 So. 2d at 678.
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seller will be held strictly liable for harm caused by his product
if 1) the product is defective; 2) the defective condition is un-
reasonably dangerous to the user; and 3) the defective condition
was the cause of the harm.'52 An increasing number of courts
are recognizing that products which contain latent foreseeable
hazards, although ostensibly perfectly made, are "defective" un-
less an adequate warning is given to the consumer.
153
In Patch v. Stanley Works, 54 the defendant company was
being sued for injuries caused to Soucy and for -the wrongful death
of Patch. The death and injuries occurred when a coating com-
pound which the two men were testing exploded. The compound,
which was manufactured by the defendant, contained a highly
flammable substance. The label, on the container, however, nei-
ther revealed the contents of the compound nor warned of its
flammable nature. Using the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 402A as its guide, the court in Patch found the manufacturer
of the compound to be strictly liable for the harm caused by the
product.' 55  The court noted that defendant's liability is clearly
explained in comment (h) to section 402A which states,
Where, however, the seller has reason to anticipate that
danger may result from a particular use, as where a drug
is sold which is safe only in limited doses, he may be re-
quired to give adequate warning of the danger . . . and a
product sold without such a warning is in a defective condi-
tion.'1 5 6
Following the reasoning of this case, it is arguable that when a
seller fails to meet the labeling requirements of the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Labeling Act, his product is defective under the
tort theory of strict liability. As a result, that seller could be held
strictly liable for any harm caused by that defective condition.
CONCLUSION
There is hardly a product used in the household, whether
liquid, gaseous or solid, a chemical compound, textile or film,
which is properly labeled under the full purview of this Act. A
casual examination of available kitchen, bathroom and recrea-
tional supplies will ordinarily reveal clear violations or minimal
back-handed compliance with the requirements of the Act. This
is particularly true of that part of the Act which requires a short
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
153. See cases cited in FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3-224.7
n.12 (Supp. 1973).
154. 448 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971).
155. Id. at 488-89.
156. Id. at 489.
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description of the principal hazard 5 7 and precautionary meas-
ures describing actions to be followed or avoided.15
These defectively labeled products are still causing and will
continue to cause untold thousands of deaths and injuries every
year." 9  Why do these products cause death and injury? The
purveyors of these products would represent that it is because of
consumer stupidity and carelessness. However, this ostensible
stupidity and carelessness often results from the failure of the
producers who place their products on the market to inform
the consuming public of the propensities and dangers of the prod-
ucts they use. Steps must be taken to educate and alarm the
populace of the potential hazards of seemingly innocent products.
Strong, effective warnings and instructions that communicate the
hazards of foreseeable and unforeseeable use of products provide
the only hope for preventing injuries and needless deaths.
Through increased enforcement, agency pressure, and civil
liability resulting from violations of the Act, the "sleeping giant"
of the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act will one day
awaken. To date, the Act has been largely ignored and more
honored in its breach than in its acceptance. Hopefully, for the
benefit of the consuming public, when the giant does awaken, the
laudable purposes of the Act will become a reality rather than
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (p)(1)(E) (1970).
158. Id. § 1261(p)(1)(F).
159. Percentage of total poisonings attributable to cleaning and polishing
agents for 1962-1965:
Year Percentage
1962 17.4%
1963 16.0%
1964 15.9%
1965 14.7%
Deaths due to nonmedicinal substances, 1962-1966:
Year Number of deaths
1962 425
1963 454
1964 388
1965 379
1966 345
U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull.
Sept.-Oct. 1968, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Tabulations
of 1967 Case Reports 6 (1968).
Statistics show that deaths among children due to accidental poisonings from
1957-1960 were categorized as follows:
Deaths due to hazardous
Year Deaths due to drugs household substances
1957 156 374
1958 150 422
1959 180 456
1960 211 445
U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull.
Sept.-Oct. 1968, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Tabulations
of 1967 Case Reports 6 (1968).
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merely an ideal. Perhaps, the goals of the Act may be more
clearly realized through massive consumer education utilizing
such methods as federal educational advertising, mass media as
well as other channels of information dissemination so that each
consumer will be aware of not only the inherent dangers of the
products he uses, but also of -the standards which must 'be met by
manufacturers of products which find their way into the American
home.
